Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
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Below that, I question the need for more determinate content. Of psychosemnatics, this is basically what Dretske already said in KFI digital v analog contents, conceptual complexity measures to differentiate coextensional contents, etc.
About your new premise 1: This is now long enough and skinny enough in threaded view that I think I can be confident that there are no more than 2 people reading it.
For instance, there may be a subcortical symmetry detection system operation, which increases the salience of symmetrical objects for further processing by cortex.
I look forward to having a closer look, and at the dissertation too. It seems the visual system cares deeply about object-hood and the Gestalt psychologists saw this of course.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
For the experimentalist, the big advantage has to do with designing experiments. That strikes me as a problem for informational semantics. Gary Gates, back at Brown. A Reply to Fodor. I am not sure there is anything like conditional reasoning in rats demonstrated in a compelling way.
Over time, we see that it only reliably carries the information that there is a single object in the world that it is interested in in tracking. While informational states may be a necessary condition for representational states, as Eric Thompson in an earlier post claimed, there are important differences.
If we are talking about the function of some neuronal region, then the neuronal details will tend to matter more. One issue that seems to be looming here is how exactly we should conceive of the relationship between work in cognitive psychoosemantics and the philosophical project of naturalizing determinate content.
Psychosemantics Quotes by Jerry A. Fodor
I must have forgotten about it by the time I finished reading all of the other comments. Same with grue, same with disjunctive properties, etc. Indeed, it is only in virtue of such relations that they are hooked up to the environment and to behavior at all. Or the honey bee.
You want to deny this? But this is how our concepts can go beyond the representational capacities of our visual systems — supposing, for the sake of argument, that teleosemantics dictates our perceptual colour representations are supposed to track fruit.
With a careful specification of what this function is one can avoid the implausible consequence that this representation means reproductive fitness. Dretske brought the baby back in from the puddle of bathwater, and the psychosemanyics is here to stay even though it is not sufficient and nobody has ever said it was sufficient: One is to just agree with the unidentified Rutgers peeps: Thanks—great posts throughout this discussion!
My point was that none of the naturalistic accounts on offer — specifically, versions of information-theoretic psychoswmantics teleological semantics — suffice to pick out fine-grained, determinate content of the sort we assume mental representation requires. About experiences, I wonder if the determinancy here need be particularly fine-grained or fine-grained in the same way as with beliefs.
In order to guide behavior in the ways that they do, the internal states of rats would have to be representational in a more full-blooded sense than mere detection-and-response mechanisms. Thanks for the response, Dan! This langauge I think was originally from Sejnowski. The difference might cause us some trouble down the line. Wondering—asking questions internally, as it were—is another state that is only indirectly linked to stimuli and behavior.
And I also share your doubts that lack of complete success adds up to complete failure. Think of it like attention, which can increase the signal-to-noise ratio of a sensory region.
This is a good place to note what seems to be a point of disagreement between us. Is that an example of content being influenced by other mental states? Many folks, I think, have seen the basic character of the problem and have a sense of how to do the tweaking. Allowing that informational states, as they have been conceived by theories of psychosemantics, are necessary but not sufficient for representation is, however, to accept the failure of such theories.